In a large panel of 26 emerging countries over the last 40 years, aggregate stock market return volatilities, our measure of uncertainty, forecast capital flows. When the stock market return volatility increases, capital inflows decrease and capital outflows increase. We propose a simple decomposition of each country's market return volatility into two components: countries differ by their exposure to systematic volatility, measured by their uncertainty betas, and by their country-specific volatility. Capital inflows respond to both systematic and countryspecific shocks to volatility, and they respond more in high uncertainty beta countries. These results are all statistically significant. A simple portfolio choice model illustrates the impact of uncertainty on gross capital flows: in the model, foreigners are exposed to expropriation risk. When the probability of expropriation increases, foreigners sell the domestic assets to the domestic investors, leading to a counter-cyclical home bias.
Introduction
International capital flows among emerging economies increased dramatically in the last 25 years.
But in 2008, at a time of great global uncertainty, international capital inflows and outflows collapsed. In this paper, we study, both empirically and theoretically, the response of international capital flows to global uncertainty shocks. In a large panel of emerging countries over the last 40 years, we find that the amount of uncertainty predicts future capital flows. We provide a model, featuring expropriation risk, to interpret the data.
We measure uncertainty in each country using the realized aggregate stock market volatility in that country. This measure is simple and available in real time. The impact on capital flows is unambiguous: volatility increases lead to "retrenchment." Future capital inflows and net inflows decrease and capital outflows increase when total volatility increases. The effects are statistically significant and robust to many controls, including country and time fixed effects. This result is driven by both global and local shocks. To disentangle the two, we regress the realized volatility of a country's stock market return on the world stock market volatility, over rolling windows. The slope coefficients in these regressions are our uncertainty betas. Total volatility can therefore be decomposed into a systematic and a country-specific component. Differences in exposure to systematic volatility are driven by differences in uncertainty betas.
We find that capital outflows, inflows, and net inflows respond significantly to country-specific volatility shocks. Future capital inflows and net inflows decrease and capital outflows increase when country-specific volatility increases. In other words, when country-specific volatility rises, foreigners pull their capital out of the high beta countries and the domestic residents of those same high beta countries sell more foreign assets than they buy. But global shocks to volatility matter too, and they matter more for high uncertainty beta countries. Capital inflows and net inflows decrease significantly more in high uncertainty beta countries than in low uncertainty beta countries in response to a global uncertainty shock. In our dataset, past uncertainty betas therefore predict the impact of future uncertainty shocks. Because volatilities and their subcomponents are estimated over rolling windows that do not encompass each global uncertainty shock under study, there is no mechanical look-ahead bias in our results.
The same volatility shocks affect macroeconomic variables: consistent with the literature on the impact of aggregate uncertainty, when total volatility increases, consumption, investment, GDP, industrial production, and employment tend to fall. Here again the effects are statistically significant and robust to many controls, including country and time fixed effects. Asset markets, which are inherently forward-looking, contain information about future capital flows and real economic activity, as well as about future differences across countries.
Capital flows depend naturally on investors' decision to invest abroad. According to a World Bank's survey (World Investment and Political Risk, 2013) , the two major constraints to foreign investment are political risk and macroeconomics instability. Our empirical finding speak to these concerns. Stock market return volatility is of course very often related to macroeconomics instability, and a high expected return volatility makes investment in a risky asset less attractive in any classic optimal portfolio problem. But an increase in expected volatility affects domestic and foreign investors in the same way, and cannot per se account for the capital reallocation between foreign and domestic investors that we see in the data. In this paper, we therefore focus on political risk, more precisely on expropriation risk, the component of political risk that is the most directly relevant to foreign investors.
Expropriation risk is a major concern for foreign investors in emerging markets. A large market of political risk insurance, many legal disputes, and many political risk indices confirm the prevalence of this concern. The Berne Union, an association of public, private, and multilateral insurance providers, reports statistics on the political risk insurance market. Political risk insurance represented up to 25% of foreign direct investment for developing economies in 1982. It is down to 14 percent of foreign direct investment, but still accounts for $100 billion of investment insurance issued in 2012. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (World Bank Group) offers standardized insurance contracts against the expropriation risk inherent in both foreign direct investments and portfolio investments. Legal fights about expropriation cases are common, and a mechanism exists to settle these fights: the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 3 Disputes is the leading international arbitration institution devoted to resolving disputes between States and foreign investors. Several firms produce and sell country risk indices to potential investors. The IHS Group, for example, builds quarterly indices of country risk. The first component of each country index corresponds to the likelihood of a 10-percentage-point increase in the rate of capital gains tax for foreign-owned businesses. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is another large database of political risk indices available at the annual frequency but over a long time window and for a large cross-section of countries. Expropriation risk is an actual, multi-form, and major source of risk for investors in emerging markets.
In the data, we proxy expropriation by a measure of capital account openness, based on the IMF annual reports, and the ICRG political risk index. Both capital account openness and political risk indices appear significantly correlated with the stock market return volatility. Times of high market volatility are times of larger capital controls and higher political risk. We therefore propose an interpretation of the dynamics of the gross capital flows based on time-variation in expropriation risk.
Our model translates the general concern for expropriation risk in a simple form. The model is an international portfolio problem in incomplete markets. In the two-country setting, each country has a representative investor and a tree producing dividends. Investors can invest in both the domestic and foreign trees. But a key friction breaks the symmetry between investors. We assume that the foreign investor is exposed to the risk of expropriation when investing in the home tree, whereas home investors are not. Expropriation risk acts like a tax on foreign holdings of the home tree. The tax is a low-probability event, and its magnitude increases with the foreign holdings, as governments are likely to face higher incentives to expropriate foreigners when foreign holdings are sizable.
In the model, dividends and the probability of expropriation follow persistent processes but, for the sake of the exposure, they respond to different and uncorrelated shocks. Because of the key role of non-linearities, we cannot rely on log-linearizations and therefore compute the model equilibrium using projection methods. To study the model dynamics, let us consider a temporary 4 increase in the expropriation probability. The foreign agent, faced with a higher probability of expropriation next period, sells some of her holdings of the domestic tree to the domestic agent, who is immune to the risk of expropriation. As a result, capital first flows out of the domestic economy. The price of the domestic tree decreases because of its higher risk. As the expropriation probability reverts to its mean, the foreign agent increases its holdings of the domestic tree, but at a lower price than in equilibrium. As a result, capital flows again towards the domestic economy, but the inflows are smaller than the previous outflows.
The model provides a potential, but clearly not the unique, explanation to the dynamics of gross capital flows. In the logic of the model, the initial shock is the increase in political risk; it implies more volatile asset prices and gross capital flows out of the country. In the real world, the increase in political risk is certainly correlated with the state of the economy. Thus news about future real activity or future expropriation may trigger capital flights. The model could be easily extended to speak to the differences across countries by introducing a global component in the endowment processes and in the expropriation probabilities. Even without such systematic component, comparative statics already show that the sensitivity of the tax rate to the foreign holdings govern the size of the price and capital flows responses: the larger the expropriation risk, the larger the stock price changes, and the larger the capital flows leaving the riskier country. Focusing on open economies, a recent literature shows that gross outflows and inflows are more informative than net flows.
1 Our work builds on two key findings in this literature: the link between capital flows and country crises, and the link between capital flows and measures of U.S.
1 See Gourinchas and Rey (2007a , 2007b ) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007 ), Backus, Henriksen, Lambert and Telmer (2009 ), Fratzscher (2012 ), Obstfeld (2012a , 2012b , Forbes and Warnock (2012) , Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012) , Rey (2013), and Broner et al. (2013) . Rey (2013) shows that gross outflow and inflows are highly correlated across countries, while net flows are not. Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2014) study the link between capital flows and U.S. monetary policy.
volatility. Broner et al. (2013) analyze the behavior of gross capital flows over the business cycle and during financial crises. Instead of taking the dates of financial crises from the literature, we explore the predictive content of market return volatility. Rey (2013) shows that gross capital flows respond contemporaneously to changes in the VIX, the U.S. option-implied volatility index, over the post-1990 sample. Forbes and Warnock (2012) obtain a similar result by focusing on large capital inflows and outflows and using the VXO index, the ancestor of the VIX, over the post-1986 period, as well as other risk factors. Bruno and Shin (2014) and Cerutti et al. (2014) report similar results on bank flows. We extend the analysis to emerging market volatilities over the sample, decompose these volatilities into their country-specific and systematic components, and study their predictive content. We add a key, ex ante source of heterogeneity across countries, i.e., their exposure to global uncertainty shocks.
Our empirical work extends Gourio, Siemer and Verdelhan (2013) (2015) . We focus on one key, novel friction, but our model could naturally be extended by adding more assets and more frictions, building on this recent literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our dataset, volatility measures, and uncertainty betas. Section 3 reports the response of capital flows and other macroeconomic variables to stock return volatility shocks. Section 4 links stock return volatility to different measures of expropriation risk. Section 5 presents a model of expropriation risk and the simulated response of capital flows to increases in the probability of expropriation. Section 6 concludes.
Systematic and Country-specific Uncertainty
This section describes the dataset and the construction of volatility measures and uncertainty betas. Gross outflows are defined as net purchases of foreign financial instruments by domestic residents.
Data
Gross inflows are defined as net sales of domestic financial instruments to foreign residents. Net capital flows are defined as the difference between gross outflows and gross inflows. Stock market return volatilities offer a simple, robust, and timely measure of uncertainty.
Volatilities
We first present a simple framework to think about time-varying volatility and then describe precisely how we measure volatilities in the data and decompose them into country-specific and global components.
Stock Market Heteroscedasticity Let us assume that the aggregate stock return in country i is driven by some world (u w t+1 ) and country i-specific (u i t+1 ) shocks:
The world shocks are, for example, summarized by the world stock market returns, and denoted The uncertainty beta is therefore
Our paper is about (1) the impact of countryspecific volatility shock ε i t+1 on international capital flows and macroeoconomic quantities, and (2) the impact of a global volatility shock ε w t+1 on international capital flows, and more precisely about the differential impact across countries with different β i s. We turn now to the description of those volatility measures in the data.
Volatility Measures Total volatility at the quarterly frequency corresponds to the average of weekly squared real stock market returns over a quarter. To decompose total volatility into its aggregate and country-specific components, we regress each country i squared returns on the world stock market squared returns:
where R i k is the return on country i during week k, R w k is the return on the world stock market index during week k. The regression is run over one year of data to provide sufficient power to estimate the betas. We therefore define three volatility components in the data:
Total volatility :
Country-specific volatility :
Global component of volatility :
where t * denotes the last week of each quarter and τ 2 is one quarter to match the frequency of the capital flows and macro variables. By construction, total volatility is the sum of the countryspecific and global volatilities. The decomposition and the uncertainty betas are time-varying since the regressions are estimated on rolling windows. We use these volatility measures as proxy for total, country-specific, and systematic uncertainty.
The Response of Capital Flows and Economic Activity to Volatility Shocks
This section reports the response of capital flows and other macroeconomic variables to volatility shocks. We run quarterly panel regressions of capital flows (or other macroeconomic variables) on past volatility:
where CF denotes capital outflows, inflows or net inflows. We run similar tests for other macroeconomic variables (e.g., GDP, consumption, investment). All regressions include country fixed effects, controls (lagged market return R Table 1 reports regression results obtained on capital flows. Increases in total volatility decrease capital inflows and increase capital outflows, both significantly. Total volatility shocks therefore entail some "retrenchment": foreign ressources flow less into the country, and domestic investors invest less abroad. The impact on net flows is more limited. Increases in total volatility tend to decrease net inflows in emerging countries, approximated by the opposite of net exports or measured in the balances of payments, but the impact is not statistically significant. 4 We take those results as our starting point and dig deeper. Are capital flows responding to local or global uncertainty shocks? To answer this question, we turn now to the two components of volatility.
Capital Flows
The country-specific component of return volatility lowers significantly inflows and increases significantly outflows. The global component of volatility impacts significantly the capital inflows to emerging countries: when global volatility increases, inflows to emerging countries dry up. Global shocks to volatility do not seem to affect significantly outflows from emerging countries.
The global component of volatility summarizes two effects: the global volatility that affects all countries and the country-specific exposure -the uncertainty beta -to global volatility. In order to control for the former and focus on the latter, we add time fixed effects to the panel regression.
The time fixed effects capture all global shocks; therefore only differences in uncertainty beta can impact capital flows. They do so significantly for inflows and net inflows, but not for outflows.
Countries that have high uncertainty betas experience lower inflows when global volatility rises.
Foreigners pull their capital out of the most risky countries in times of crises. This result is driven mostly by private capital flows (official transactions are not important) and in particular by the "other inflows." High uncertainty beta countries experience significantly lower net inflows in times of global volatility shocks.
In a nutshell, capital inflows decrease and capital outflows increase when total volatility increases. Capital outflows and inflows respond to country-specific volatility shocks. Capital inflows and net inflows decrease more in high uncertainty beta countries than in low uncertainty beta countries in response to a global uncertainty shock. All these effects are statistically significant.
Real Economic Activity
Let us turn now to the impact of volatility shocks on real economic activity. Table 2 reports regression results obtained on GDP, investment, consumption, industrial production, and (the opposite of) the unemployment rate. All responses are statistically significant and in the same direction:
an increase in total volatility decreases real economic activity. GDP, investment, consumption, industrial production, and employment all decline in response to an uncertainty shock. This result is consistent with the literature on the impact of uncertainty.
We find that both country-specific and global volatility shocks affect significantly these macroeconomic variables. The negative impact of country-specific volatility shocks on GDP, investment, 
CF denotes capital outflows, inflows, or net inflows. All regressions include country fixed effects, controls (lagged market return R The table reports the coefficients β 1 , the number of observations and the R 2 . The first column provides the results for net exports, the second column for net inflows, the third column for capital outflows, and the fourth column for capital inflows. All variables are quarterly. The number of observations varies in each regression because of data availability; for each variable, all countries with available data are included. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Three stars (***) denote significance at the 1% confidence level, while two stars (**) and one (*) star denote significance at the 5% and 10% confidence levels.
13 consumption, and industrial production is robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects in the panel regressions. Global volatility shocks affect significantly real economic activity. Controlling for the common component of volatility through fixed effects, clear cross-country differences appear: in response to a global volatility shock, high uncertainty beta experience significantly lower GDP, investment, consumption, and industrial production than low uncertainty beta countries. Crises remain unpredictable, but when a crisis hits, there is a pattern in the data: some countries will predictably experience worse real economic outcomes.
Market-based measures of volatility therefore impact both capital flows and real activity. They are determined in real time, without any look-ahead bias in the researcher's methodology. They are informative about future macroeconomic aggregates certainly because asset markets are forward looking. Many factors may influence these return volatilities. In the rest of this paper, we explore their link, in the data and in a model, to some form of expropriation risk.
Stock Return Volatility and Expropriation Risk
This section studies the correlation between stock return volatility and expropriation risk. We 
X denotes GDP, investment, consumption, industrial production, and (the opposite of) the unemployment rate. All regressions include country fixed effects, controls (lagged market return R All variables are quarterly. GDP, investment, consumption, industrial production are expressed as log year-on-year differences. The number of observations varies in each regression because of data availability; for each variable, all countries with available data are included. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Three stars (***) denote significance at the 1% confidence level, while two stars (**) and one (*) star denote significance at the 5% and 10% confidence levels. 
where V ol denotes the four quarter moving average of total stock return volatility and X denotes the ChinnIto (2008) Both capital controls and political risk indices appear significantly correlated with countryspecific stock return volatilities, but not with global volatilities. Table 3 reports the correlation between stock return volatility and measures of expropriation risk. Periods of high uncertainty are periods with more restrictions on capital flows and more political risk. This result is intuitive.
Governments tend to establish capital controls in times of trouble. Likewise, proposals for taxing foreigners tend also to be discussed in times of trouble. We do not establish, however, any causal link in the data; we only report correlations. Because of the annual frequency, we can not precisely study any lead-lag relationship either. Instead, in order to interpret our empirical findings, we propose a simple model of gross capital flows.
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A Simple Model of Gross Capital Flows with Expropriation Risk
This section introduces a simple equilibrium model of optimal portfolio choice to interpret the evidence uncovered in the previous sections. This evidence requires generating sharp movements in opposite direction of gross inflows (i.e., net sales of domestic assets by foreigners) and gross outflows (i.e., net sales of domestic assets by residents). This is challenging because in general a shock, such as a change in the riskiness of the assets of the two countries, would lead both foreigners and residents to change their portfolio allocation in the same direction. The model reflects our first attempt at breaking this symmetry: we assume that foreigners differ from residents in that they face expropriation risk. This expropriation risk varies stochastically over time. The model then studies the effect of exogenous changes in the riskiness of different countries on gross international capital flows. We first present the model setup, then discuss briefly the solution method, and finally report some preliminary simulation results.
Model Setup
The model is an endowment economy with two countries, one representative agent in each country, and a single good (the same good in both countries). A star denotes a foreign variable. In each country, a tree produces dividends, denoted {D t } for the home tree and {D t } for the foreign tree. Both {D t } and {D t } follow exogenous stochastic processes. There are no trade costs and no labor income. We denote by P and P the price of one share of the domestic and foreign tree respectively, and by S i,j the number of units of of tree j held by agent i, i.e. the share of tree j owned by i. Hence S f,h is the share of home tree held by the foreign agent.
In each country, the representative agent has standard expected utility preferences. The home representative agent, for example, maximizes:
17 by choosing (1) how much to consume (C t ) and (2) how many shares of the domestic (S h,h ) and foreign (S h,f ) trees to buy, subject to a budget constraint described below. The foreign representative agent solves a similar maximization problem. Thus far, the model describes a classic two-tree portfolio optimization problem.
We depart from the frictionless two-tree portfolio problem by introducing expropriation risk, which takes the form of a stochastic tax on the foreigners' holdings of domestic capital. To keep the model simple, we assume that assets invested in the foreign country are not exposed to any expropriation, and that domestic residents are not subject to expropriation risk either. The proceeds from this tax are used either for government spending, or are rebated as lump-sum transfers to the domestic agents and the foreigners.
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The tax rate, denoted τ t , depends on the state of the economy as follows:
Intuitively, a larger share of foreign assets held by foreigners increases the incentives to expropriate them. More technically, this formulation implies that the tax rate disappears as the foreigner share goes to zero, and hence helps ensure that the equilibrium does not hit corner solutions. Last, expropriation is a low probability event: the tax rate is zero with probability 1 − p t and strictly positive with probability p t . The probability of expropriation p t , drawn at time t − 1, follows an autoregressive process. The proceeds from the expropriation are denoted by R t . They correspond to the product of the tax rate times the tax base, which is itself governed by the shares held times their (cum-dividend) price:
Given these assumptions, the budget constraints of the home and foreign investors are respectively:
and
where α 2 and α 3 denote the share of expropriation proceeds that are rebated lump-sum to domestic and foreign investors respectively. Finally, the market clearing conditions for goods and assets impose that:
where α 1 denotes the share of expropriation proceeds that is spent by the government.
Solution, Calibration, and Simulation Method
We first describe the system of equations that characterize the equilibrium. We then explain our numerical solution method and our choice for stochastic processes. Finally, we discuss briefly our parameters.
Equilibrium conditions Assuming the existence of an interior solution, the maximization problems of the home and foreign agents imply the following four first-order conditions:
The first two equations correspond to the optimal portfolio choice of the home investor, while the last two equations correspond to the optimal portfolio choice of the foreign investor. Those four equations coupled with the feasibility constraints, the clearing market conditions, and a budget constraint summarize the model.
Numerical Solution Method
The model is solved using projection methods similar to Judd (1992) and Aruoba, Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2006), following the steps outlined in Rabitsch, Stepanchuk and Tsyrennikov (2014) . In simple portfolio models, the only endogenous state variable is the relative wealth of the agents. In our case, because the tax proceeds R t depend on the foreign-held share of the domestic asset, an additional state variable is necessary to describe the model solution. For simplicity, we pick this share as our second state variable.
The method solves for six policy functions, which depend on the two endogenous state variables as well as the exogenous shocks. These shocks are discretized and approximated through Markov chains. We approximate the six policy functions by (tensor of) Chebyshev polynomials. The precise implementation of the projection method is described in the Appendix.
The process for exogenous variables The dividend dynamics are described by two exogenous state variables (D t and D t ):
where the shocks ε t+1 are i.i.d and normally distributed according to a N (0, Σ) distribution.
Calibration Table 4 describes the model parameters. The risk-aversion coefficient is set to 1, while the discount factor is set to 0.9. The autoregressive coefficient of the dividend level is equal to 0.1. The expropriation proceeds are either wasted (33%), or rebated to home and foreign investors (33% each). The tax rate sensitivity is set to 10 −5 . We view this calibration as preliminary. 
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where A is a diagonal matrix with a as diagonal values and the shocks ε t+1 are i.i.d and normally distributed according to a N (0, Σ) distribution. The expropriation probability p t follows a recursive process:
, where the shocks u t+1 are i.i.d and normally distributed according to a N (0, σ 2 ) distribution.
Simulation Results
Let us first describe the model equilibrium before turning to the impulse response functions to expropriation probability shocks. As foreign investors become relatively wealthier, their holdings of both trees and their consumption increase, whereas the opposite happens to domestic investors.
6
As foreign investors become relatively wealthier, the foreign tree becomes more expensive, whereas the home tree becomes less expensive. Figure 1 reports the same variables as a function of the expropriation probability. Consumption does not move, but prices and holdings change with the level of expropriation risk. When the expropriation probability increases, foreign investors want to hold a lower share of the domestic tree and a larger share of the foreign tree. The price of the domestic tree declines, while the price of the foreign tree increases. Table 4 .
These equilibrium functions explain the dynamics of the impulse response functions described in Figure 2 . There, the probability of an expropriation in the future increases initially and then mean-reverts slowly. The foreign agent sells some of her holdings of the domestic tree to the domestic agent, who is immune to the expropriation risk. The foreigner's share of the home tree decreases while her share of the foreign tree increases. Because of the market clearing condition, the share of the foreign tree held by the domestic agent must therefore decline. Capital flows in the model can be measured as P t S hf t+1 − P t−1 S hf t : they correspond to the value of the foreign tree held by the domestic agent at date t + 1 minus the value of the foreign tree held by the domestic agent at date t. Since the domestic agent is buying her own tree and selling the foreign tree, the home country (which is exposed to expropriation risk) first experiences large capital outflows.
A price effect then kicks in. The price of the domestic tree decreases to reflect its riskiness.
The price of the foreign tree increases to clear the demand. When the expropriation probability reverts back to its initial level, the home country then experiences capital inflows, but those flows are in magnitude smaller than the previous capital outflows. The lower size of capital inflows than outflows is due to a price effect: the home tree is cheaper than it used to be. Therefore going back to the previous equilibrium portfolio allocation requires less capital flows.
How does the model compare to the data? Let us first consider the dynamics of capital flows and then the cross-country differences. The model-based impulse response function appears similar to the impulse response function obtained on actual data when considering a shock to total stock return volatility. Figure 3 presents the data counterpart. The impulse response functions are estimated by local projections following Jorda (2005). On average, emerging countries first experience negative net inflows after a spike in stock return volatility. The net inflows are the most negative after two quarters. After four quarters, net inflows change sign, emerging countries tend to experience positive net inflows but their absolute value is lower than the initial outflows.
The model features only one country subject to expropriation risk, but comparative statics help interpret actual data on cross-country differences. In the model, the larger the expropriation risk (λ), the larger the stock price changes, and the larger the capital flows response. In the logic of the Table 4 . model, the initial shock is the increase of the expropriation probability. This shock affects equity prices, increasing their volatility, and money flows out of the country because foreign investors fear being taxed.
The model so far does not distinguish between country-specific and global volatility. Doing so would require the definition of global shocks. One could easily imagine that the expropriation probability has two components: a global component, common to all countries, and a countryspecific component. For the sake of clarity, shocks on the expropriation probability are orthogonal to the endowment shocks in the model. They are certainly correlated in the data: governments consider expropriation measures in bad times, not in good times. Therefore, along with the two components of expropriation probability, global and country-specific shocks could be introduced on endowments. The model then would interpret differences in uncertainty betas in terms of differences in the size of expropriation risk. A high volatility beta thus corresponds to a higher level λ of expropriation risk linked to global shocks.
The model therefore suggests a potential interpretation of the capital flows dynamics. The model calibration, however, has several weaknesses. The model does not reproduce fully the equity home bias in the data: while the U.S. stock market represents close to a third of the world stock market, actual U.S. investors tend to allocate more than two-thirds of their assets to U.S. stocks.
The model does not reproduce the level of the price-dividend ratio or the average equity return in the data. The model does not reproduce the volatility of equity prices or capital flows. To sum up, the current calibration offers a qualitative but not quantitative interpretation of the data.
Potential Extensions
Three different extensions can be considered. First, the representative investor could be characterized by Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences instead of constant relative risk-aversion. By disentangling the coefficient of risk aversion and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES) the model could then feature large expected equity returns (due to high risk aversion) and equity drop prices when volatility increases (due to high IES). Second, the model could feature different goods across countries and home bias in consumption (as in Heathcote and Perri, 2013) . The introduction of exchange rate risk and home bias in consumption would help the model reproduce the well-known equity home bias. Third, the set of assets traded could include domestic and foreign bonds along the two equity claims. As Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) show, in the presence of exchange rate risk, the introduction of such bonds has a large impact on the optimal portfolio allocation.
Conclusion
This paper documents that economic uncertainty has a significant impact on international capital flows for a large set of emerging countries. We measure economic uncertainty through the volatility of stock market returns, and distinguish between total, country-specific and systematic volatilities.
An increase in economic uncertainty increases gross capital outflows and decreases gross capital inflows. The effect on international capital inflows is stronger for countries that have a higher exposure to global stock market volatility. We develop a simple model in which home and foreign investors behave differently because foreign investors face some expropriation risk. The model is able to generate qualitatively the effect of uncertainty on capital flows.
a standard monetary DSGE model. Shocks to uncertainty generate significant reductions in output. Gabaix (2012) and Gourio (2012) offer potential alternative interpretations of uncertainty shocks in terms of shocks to disaster probabilities. Table 5 report the starting year of all series in our sample. We then display for idiosyncratic, total and world Volatility the median, and the 95th percentile. Finally, we show the fraction of total volatility that is explained by world volatility. We use the following definitions for volatility: Total volatility:
Appendix B Data
i,k , Country-specific volatility: 
CF denotes capital outflows, inflows, or net inflows. All regressions include country fixed effects, controls (lagged market return R 
X denotes GDP, investment, consumption, industrial production, and (the opposite of) the unemployment rate. All regressions include country fixed effects, controls (lagged market return R The number of observations varies in each regression because of data availability; for each variable, all countries with available data are included. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Three stars (***) denote significance at the 1% confidence level, while two stars (**) and one (*) star denote significance at the 5% and 10% confidence levels. 
CF denotes capital outflows, inflows, or net inflows. All regressions include country fixed effects, controls (lagged market return R for net exports, the second column for net inflows, the third column for capital outflows, and the fourth column for capital inflows. All variables are quarterly. Countries are weighted by their relative size, as measured by their GDP. The number of observations varies in each regression because of data availability; for each variable, all countries with available data are included. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Three stars (***) denote significance at the 1% confidence level, while two stars (**) and one (*) star denote significance at the 5% and 10% confidence levels. measured by their GDP. GDP, investment, consumption, industrial production are expressed as log year-on-year differences. The number of observations varies in each regression because of data availability; for each variable, all countries with available data are included. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Three stars (***) denote significance at the 1% confidence level, while two stars (**) and one (*) star denote significance at the 5% and 10% confidence levels.
The policy functions that to be approximated are P (ω, S f,h , σ, x, p), P * (ω, S f,h , σ, x, p), C(ω, S f,h , σ, x, p), C * (ω, S f,h , σ, x, p), S h,h (ω, S f,h , σ, x, p), S h,f (ω, S f,h , σ, x, p), S f,h (ω, S f,h , σ, x, p) and S f,f (ω, S f,h , σ, x, p). Each iteration consists of two key steps: First, given the guess for the policy functions and all possible combinations of states tomorrow we solve for the implied relative wealth tomorrow, ω . Using the guess for the policy functions and ω we can then compute expectations and solve the for the coefficient φ that imply R((ω, S f,h , σ, x, p, φ) = 0. There is a trade of between precision of the solution and computational feasibility. While higher order polynomials allow for highly non-linear policy functions, they lead to a large number of unknown coefficients at the same time which makes the computation of the solution very difficult. In order to ease this problem we therefore start with a low order polynomial for the state variables S f,h (ω, S f,h , σ, x, p). A crucial element to reach convergence is the initial guess for the φ coefficients. It is helpful to use the solution of a the model without expropriation risk as initial guess for the model with expropriation risk. Updating of the guess via a Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm and iterating until convergence gives the solution to the model. The Jacobian for the Levenberg-Marquardt method is computed analytically which results in a significant computational speedup compared in comparison to computing it via finite differences. The result of the low order polynomial can be used to increase the order of the polynomials where the additional coefficients are assigned a zero initial guess. Table 4 .
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Appendix E Simplified Model
Add equations here E t (P * t+1 + D * t+1 )u (C t+1 ) E t ((P t+1 + D t+1 )u (C t+1 )) = P * t P t (Appendix E.1)
where C t+1 = (1 − π) (P t+1 + D t+1 )S hh t+1 + (P * t+1 + D * t+1 )S hf t+1 + α 2 R t+1 and
Appendix E.1 Analytical Jacobian
Lets define a = E t (P * t+1 + D * t+1 )u (C t+1 ) and b = E t ((P t+1 + D t+1 )u (C t+1 )) Then for the jacobian we need the following derivatives: (for the first equation here, the second is very similar) (Appendix E.6) The derivatives used above can easily be determined through
(Appendix E.7) ∂b ∂C t+1 = (P t+1 + D t+1 )(−γ)C −γ−1 t+1
(Appendix E.8)
(Appendix E.9)
The derivatives of C t+1 w.r.t P, P*, Shh, Shf will be computed by matlab symbolic toolbox and then evaluated.
